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Abstract—We consider the MIMO wiretap channel, that is
a MIMO broadcast channel where the transmitter sends some
confidential information to one user which is a legitimate receiver,
while the other user is an eavesdropper. Perfect secrecy is
achieved when the transmitter and the legitimate receiver can
communicate at some positive rate, while insuring that the
eavesdropper gets zero bits of information. In this paper, we
compute the perfect secrecy capacity of the multiple antenna
MIMO broadcast channel, where the number of antennas is
arbitrary for both the transmitter and the two receivers. Our
technique involves a careful study of a Sato-like upper bound
via the solution of a certain algebraic Riccati equation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a traditional confidentiality setting, a transmitter (Alice)
wants to send some secret message to a legitimate receiver
(Bob), and prevent the eavesdropper (Eve) to read the message.
From an information theoretic point of view, the commu-
nication channel involved can be modeled as a broadcast
channel, following the wire-tap channel model introduced by
Wyner [22]: a transmitter broadcasts its message, say wk ∈
Wk, encoded into a codeword xn, and the two receivers (the
legitimate and the illegitimate) respectively receive yn and
zn, the output of their channel. The amount of ignorance
that the eavesdropper has about a message wk is called the
equivocation rate, defined as:
Definition 1: The equivocation rate Re is defined as
Re =
1
n
h(wk|zn),
with 0 ≤ Re ≤ h(wk)/n. Clearly, if Re is equal to the
information rate h(wk)/n, then I(zn|wk) = 0, which yields
perfect secrecy.
Associated with secrecy is a perfect secrecy rate Rs, which
is the amount of information that can be sent not only reliably
but also confidentially, with the help of a (2nRs , n) code.
Definition 2: A perfect secrecy rate Rs is said to be achiev-
able if for any , ′ > 0, there exists a sequence of (2nRs , n)
codes such that for any n ≥ n(, ′), we have
Pe ≤ ′ (1)
Rs −  ≤ Re. (2)
The first condition (1), where Pe is the probability of decoding
erroneously, is the standard definition of achievable rate as far
as reliability is concerned. The second condition (2) guarantees
secrecy, up to the equivocation rate, which we will require to
be h(wk)/n to have perfect secrecy. The secrecy capacity is
defined similarly to the standard capacity:
Definition 3: The secrecy capacity Cs is the maximum
achievable perfect secrecy rate.
In this paper, we are interested in the secrecy capacity for
the case where Alice, Bob and Eve are communicating via
multiple antenna channels.
A. Previous work
In his seminal work [22], Wyner showed for discrete mem-
oryless channels that the perfect secrecy capacity is actually
the difference of the capacity of the two users, under the
assumption that the channel of the eavesdropper is a degraded
version of the channel of the legitimate receiver. This result
has been generalized to Gaussian channels by Leung et al. [9].
In [4], Gopala et al. have shown that the secrecy capacity
is also the difference of the two capacities in the case of
a single antenna fading channel, under the assumption of
asymptotically long coherence intervals, when the transmitter
either knows both channels or only the legitimate channel. In
[1], [2], Barros et al. have characterized information theoretic
security in terms of outage probability. Independently, Liang
et al. [12], [13] and Li et al. [10] have computed the secrecy
capacity for the parallel wiretap channel with independent
subchannels. The secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with
single antenna fading channel follows.
A first study involving multiple antenna channels has been
proposed by Hero [5], in a different context than the wire-
tap channel. In [19], the SIMO wiretap channel has been
considered. In [11], the secrecy capacity is computed for the
MISO case. Furthermore, a lower bound is computed in the
MIMO case. The secrecy capacity for the MISO case has also
been proven independently by Khisti et al. [7] and Shafiee et
al. [20]. In [7], the authors furthermore give an upper bound
for the MIMO case, in a regime asymptotic in SNR. The
secrecy capacity has been computing for the particular cases
where both the transmitter and receiver have two antennas, and
the eavesdropper has either one antenna [21] or two antennas
[17]. Finally, Liu et al. [14], [15] computed the secrecy
capacity for a Gaussian broadcast channel, where a multi-
antenna transmitter sends independent confidential messages
to two users.
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The contribution of this paper is to compute the perfect
secrecy capacity of the multiple antenna wire-tap channel, for
any number of transmit/receive antennas. In order to compute
the secrecy capacity, we provide a proof technique for the
converse, which allows us to deal with channels that are not
degraded. Note that our result shows that the inner bound by
Li et al. [11] is tight, and this is proved by the computation
of an upper bound that actually matches the lower bound.
Independently of our results, Khisthi and Wornell [8] have also
computed the secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel
(which they refer to as MIMO-ME). An alternative derivation
of our result, and that of Khisti-Wornell, has also appeared in
Liu and Shamai [16].
B. The MIMO wiretap channel
We consider the MIMO wiretap channel, that is, a broadcast
channel where the transmitter is equipped with n transmit
antennas, while the legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper
have respectively nM and nE receive antennas, namely:
Y = HMX + VM
Z = HEX + VE
where Y, VM and Z, VE are resp. nM ×1 and nE×1 vectors.
We have that X is the n× 1 complex transmitted signal, with
covariance matrix KX  0n with power constraint Tr(KX) =
P , while HM and HE are respectively nM × n and nE × n
fixed channel matrices. They are both assumed to be known at
the transmitter. Along the paper we will usually consider two
cases: the definite case, that is when H∗MHM  H∗EHE or
H∗EHE  H∗MHM , which corresponds to the degraded case,
and the indefinite case, which is when some of the eigenvalues
of H∗EHE −H∗MHM are positive, and other negative or zero.
The vectors VM , VE are independent circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian with identity covariance KM = InM ,
KE = InE and independent of the transmitted signal X .
Our main result is:
Theorem 1: The secrecy capacity CS of the MIMO wiretap
channel is given by
max
KX0
log det(I + HMKXH∗M )− log det(I + HEKXH∗E)
with Tr(KX) = P .
The paper contains the main parts of the proof of the above
theorem.
II. ON THE ACHIEVABILITY
In this section, we state the achievability part of the secrecy
capacity, and further prove that in the non-degraded case, the
achievability is maximized by n× n matrices KX which are
low rank, that is of any rank r < n.
Proposition 1: The perfect secrecy rate
Rs = max
KX0
log det(I+HMKXH∗M )−log det(I+HEKXH∗E)
with Tr(KX) = P , is achievable.
This has already been proved [11]. In fact, the interpretation
is obvious. When KX is chosen, the difference between
the resulting mutual informations to the legitimate user and
eavesdropper can be secretly transmitted.
Proposition 2: Let K˜X be an optimal solution to the opti-
mization problem
max
KX0
log det(I + HMKXH∗M )− log det(I + HEKXH∗E),
where Tr(KX) = P and H∗EHE−H∗MHM is either indefinite
or semidefinite. Then K˜X is a low rank matrix.
Proof: To show that the optimal K˜X is low rank, we
define a Lagrangian which includes the power constraint, and
show that this yields no solution. From there, we can conclude
that the optimal solution is on the boundary of the cone of
positive semi-definite matrices, i.e., matrices of rank r < n.
We thus define the following Lagrangian:
log det(InM + HMKXH
∗
M )
− log det(InE + HEKXH∗E)− λTr(KX),
and look for its stationary points, that is for the solution of
the following equation:
∇KX (log det(I + HMKXH∗M )
− log det(I + HEKXH∗E)− λTr(KX)) = 0
⇐⇒ H∗MHM (I + KXH∗MHM )−1
= (I + H∗EHEKX)
−1H∗EHE + λIn.
(3)
By pre-multiplying the above equation by (I + H∗EHEKX)
and post-multiplying it by (I + KXH∗MHM ), we get
H∗MHM −H∗EHE = λ(I + H∗EHEKX)(I + KXH∗MHM ),
or equivalently, by further pre and post-multiplying by KX ,
KX(H∗MHM −H∗EHE)KX 1λ =
(KX + KXH∗EHEKX)(KX + KXH
∗
MHMKX).
(4)
Now if KX  0, then all the eigenvalues of (KX +
KXH
∗
EHEKX)(KX + KXH
∗
MHMKX) are strictly positive
(Lemma 1 below). This implies that (4) can have a solution if
and only if the Hermitian matrix KX(H∗MHM−H∗EHE)KX 1λ
is positive definite. This means that either H∗MHM  H∗EHE
and λ > 0, or H∗MHM ≺ H∗EHE and λ < 0. This gives
a contradiction if H∗MHM − H∗EHE is either indefinite or
semidefinite, implying that K˜X has to be low rank.
Lemma 1: If A = A∗  0 and B = B∗  0, then the
matrix AB has all positive eigenvalues.
Proof: Since A  0, we can write A = A1/2(A∗)1/2
with A1/2 invertible. Therefore,
AB = A1/2((A∗)1/2BA1/2)A−1/2,
has the same eigenvalues as the matrix (A∗)1/2BA1/2, which
is positive definite.
III. PROOF OF THE CONVERSE
The goal of this section is to prove the converse, namely
Theorem 2: For any sequence of (2nRs , n) codes with
probability of error Pe ≤ ′ and equivocation rate Rs− ≤ Re
for any n ≥ n(, ′), , ′ > 0, then the secrecy rate Rs satisfies
Rs ≤ max
KX0
log det(I+HMKXH∗M )−log det(I+HEKXH∗E),
with Tr(KX) = P .
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A. Bound on I(X;Y |Z) and result for the degraded case
We start by recalling a standard result [9], [4].
Lemma 2: Given any sequence of (2nRs , n) codes with
Pe ≤  and Rs −  ≤ Re for any n ≥ n(),  > 0, the
secrecy rate Rs can be upper bounded as follows:
Rs −  ≤ 1
n
[I((Xn, Y n|Zn) + δ], , δ > 0.
We thus focus on finding an upper bound on I(X;Y |Z).
Proposition 3: We have the following upper bound:
I(X;Y |Z) ≤ max
KX0
I˜(X;Y |Z)
where I˜(X;Y |Z) is given by
log det
(
I + (H∗M H
∗
E)
(
I A
A∗ I
)−1(
HM
HE
)
KX
)
− log det(I + HEKXH∗E).
(5)
and A denotes the correlation between VM and VE , which
satisfies I−AA∗  0.
Proof: An upper bound on I(X;Y |Z) is obtained by
assuming that the legitimate receiver knows both its channel
and the one of the eavesdropper, so that the capacity of the
link between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver is that
of a MIMO system, namely
max
KX
log det
[
In + [H∗M H
∗
E ]
[
InM A
A∗ InE
]−1[
HM
HE
]
KX
]
where A has to satisfy I − AA∗  0. Now the channel we
consider is degraded, and an upper bound is thus the difference
of the two capacities, which yields the result.
We can now conclude the proof of the converse for the “sim-
ple” cases when H∗MHM  H∗EHE or H∗EHE  H∗MHM .
Proposition 4: 1) If H∗MHM  H∗EHE , we have that
I(X;Y |Z) ≤ max
KX0
log det(I + HMKXH∗M )−
log det(I + HEKXH∗E).
2) Vice versa, if H∗EHE  H∗MHM , then I(X;Y |Z) = 0.
Proof: Let us introduce two other ways of writing
I˜(X;Y |Z) (see (5)). Let us first compute a UDL factorization:[
InM A
A∗ InE
]
=
[
I A
0 I
] [
I−AA∗ 0
0 I
] [
I 0
A∗ I
]
so that[
I A
A∗ I
]−1
=
[
I 0
−A∗ I
] [
(I−AA∗)−1 0
0 I
] [
I −A
0 I
]
and we have that
(H∗M H
∗
E)
(
I A
A∗ I
)−1(
HM
HE
)
=
(H∗M −H∗EA∗)(I−AA∗)−1(HM −AHE) + H∗EHE .
Thus a first equivalent formula for I˜(X;Y |Z) is given by
log det(I + ((H∗M −H∗EA∗)(I−AA∗)−1(HM −AHE)+
H∗EHE)KX)− log det(I + HEKXH∗E).
(6)
By considering now a LDU factorization, we get[
I A
A∗ I
]
=
[
I 0
A∗ I
] [
I 0
0 I−A∗A
] [
I A
0 I
]
,
[
I A
A∗ I
]−1
=
[
I −A
0 I
] [
I 0
0 (I−A∗A)−1
] [
I 0
−A∗ I
]
so that
(H∗M H
∗
E)
(
I A
A∗ I
)−1(
HM
HE
)
= H∗MHM+
(−H∗MA + H∗E)(I−A∗A)−1(−A∗HM + HE)
and a second equivalent formula for I˜(X;Y |Z) is given by
log det(I + H∗MHMKX+
(−H∗MA + H∗E)(I−A∗A)−1(−A∗HM + HE)KX)
− log det(I + HEKXH∗E).
(7)
Since the secrecy capacity does not depend on A, and that
I(X;Y |Z) ≤ max
KX
I˜(X;Y |Z),
for all A such that I−AA∗  0, we are now free to take any
such A which does not depend on a choice of KX .
Case 1. If H∗MHM  H∗EHE , we will now show that there
always exists a matrix A such that H∗MA = H
∗
E and I −
AA∗  0. Note that using (7), we then get
I˜(X;Y |Z) = log det(I+H∗MHMKX)−log det(I+H∗EHEKX).
Now H∗MHM  H∗EHE implies that HMH∗M = H∗EHE +
X∗X , for some X∗X  0. Now this means [6] that there
exists a unitary matrix Θ such that [H∗E X
∗] = [H∗M 0] Θ .
Partitioning Θ, we get
[H∗E X
∗] = [H∗M 0]
[
Θ11 Θ12
Θ21 Θ22
]
from which it follows that H∗E = H
∗
MΘ11. Note that we can
take A = Θ11, since Θ∗11Θ11 ≺ I as it is a sub-block of a
unitary matrix, and using the fact that X∗X  0.
Case 2. This is similar when H∗EHE  H∗MHM .
The cases described in the lemma can be understood as a
simple generalization of the scalar case, since those are the
degraded cases. When H∗MHM  H∗EHE , all links to the
legitimate receiver are better, and the capacity is given by the
difference of the two capacities, while if H∗EHE  H∗MHM ,
then all links to the eavesdropper are better, and thus no
positive secrecy capacity can be achieved.
We are now left with the interesting case when H∗MHM −
H∗EHE is indefinite, which is the non-degraded case.
B. Minimization over A and maximization over KX
Since Proposition 3 is true for all A such that I−AA∗  0,
we get
I(X;Y |Z) ≤ min
A
max
KX
I˜(X;Y,Z).
To understand this double optimization, we start by analyzing
the function I˜(X;Y,Z).
ISIT 2008, Toronto, Canada, July 6 - 11, 2008
526
Authorized licensed use limited to: CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on October 13, 2008 at 12:31 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
Proposition 5: The function I˜(X;Y, Z) defined in (5) is
concave in KX and convex in A. Consequently,
min
A
max
KX
I˜(X;Y |Z) = max
KX
min
A
I˜(X;Y |Z)
where Tr(KX) = P , KX  0, I−AA∗  0.
This proof is skipped here by lack of space (see [18]).
We next compute the minimization over A. Note that we
can write I˜(X;Y |Z) in the following alternative way:
log det(HMKXH∗M + InM−
(HMKXH∗E + A)(HEKXH
∗
E + I)
−1(HEKXH∗M + A
∗))
− log det(InM −AA∗).
(8)
Proposition 6: Let A˜∗ be a local minima of I˜(X;Y |Z).
Then
A˜∗ = (HEV QW )(HMV PW )−1,
where W is an (nM + nE − n) ×m matrix, 0 ≤ m ≤ nM ,
(PT QT )T is orthogonal to (−H∗M H∗E), P,Q of dimension
resp. nM × (nM + nE − n), nE × (nM + nE − n), and V is
a n× (nM −m) matrix, such that(
HMV
HEV
)
is an invariant subspace of M , as defined in (9).
Proof: Let M1,M2,M3, X be square complex matrices.
Set f(X) = M1 − (X + M2)M3(X∗ + M∗2 ). We have that
∇X log det(f(X)) = −f(X)−1(X + M2)M3.
Using this formula, we compute that ∇A∗ I˜(X;Y |Z) = 0 iff
f(A)(A∗ + HEKXH∗M )
−1(HEKXH∗E + I) =
(I−AA∗)(A∗)−1,
where f(A) is given by
HMKXH
∗
M + I
−(HMKXH∗E + A)(HEKXH∗E + I)−1(HEKXH∗M + A∗).
We get a nonsymmetric algebraic Ricatti equation given by
A∗(HMKXH∗M+I)
−1HMKXH∗EA
∗+A∗(HMKXH∗M+I)
−1+
[−HEKXH∗E−I+HEKXH∗M (HMKXH∗M+I)−1HMKXH∗E ]A∗
+HEKXH∗M (HMKXH
∗
M + I)
−1 = 0.
One way of solving an algebraic Riccati [3] of the form
0 = M21 + M22A∗ −A∗M11 −A∗M12A∗,
is to look for invariant subspaces of
M =
(
M11 M12
M21 M22
)
.
Here we have that M is given by
M11 = −(HMKXH∗M + I)−1
M12 = −(HMKXH∗M + I)−1HMKXH∗E
M21 = HEKXH∗M (HMKXH
∗
M + I)
−1
M22 = −HEKXH∗E − I+
HEKXH
∗
M (HMKXH
∗
M + I)
−1HMKXH∗E .
(9)
Set
F =
(
HMKXH
∗
M + InM 0
0 InE
)
.
It is easy to see that F (M + I) is given by[ −HM
−HE + HEKXH∗M (HMKXH∗M + I)−1HM
]
KX [−H∗M H∗E ]
which implies that −1 is an eigenvalue of M . Thus a first
invariant subspace is given by the eigenspace associated to
−1, which is the kernel of M + I, or in other words, the
subspace (PT QT )T orthogonal to (−KXH∗M KXH∗E).
We further rewrite M as( −HM (KXH∗MHM + I)−1
−HE + HE(KXH∗MHM + I)−1KXH∗MHM
)
·
(−KXH∗M KXH∗E)− I
=
( −HM
−HE
)
(KXH∗MHM + I)
−1(−KXH∗M KXH∗E)− I.
Thus, a Jordan basis of M is given by(
HM P
HE Q
)
with (PT QT )T orthogonal to (−H∗M H∗E).
Finally, solutions of the Ricatti equation are given [3], in
the general case, by:
A˜∗ = (HEV QW )(HMV PW )−1,
where W is an nM ×m matrix, 0 ≤ m ≤ nM , and V is a
nM × nM −m matrix, such that(
HMV
HEV
)
is an invariant subspace of M . Note that W can be chosen
arbitrary since (PT , QT )T is the eigenspace associated to −1.
Proposition 7: Let K˜X be an optimal solution to the opti-
mization problem
maxKX minA I˜(X;Y |Z)
s.t. KX  0, Tr(KX) = P,
where A˜∗ = (HEV QW )(HMV PW )−1 is the optimal
solution for the minimization over A. Then K˜X is low rank.
Proof: Note that I˜(X;Y |Z) can be written
log det(I + BKX)− log det(I + HEKXH∗E),
where
B := (H∗M −H∗EA∗)(I−AA∗)−1(HM −AHE) + H∗EHE .
We now show that B −H∗EHE is low rank by showing that
(H∗M − H∗EA∗) is low rank. Indeed, we have that A∗ =
(HEV QW )(HMV PW )−1. Therefore,
H∗M −H∗EA∗ = (H∗M −H∗E)
(
I
A∗
)
= (H∗M −H∗E)
(
HMV PW
HEV QW
)
(HMV PW )−1
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which, since (PT QT )T is orthogonal to (H∗M −H∗E) yields
H∗M −H∗EA∗ = ((H∗MHM −H∗EHE)V 0)(HMV PW )−1,
which, as desired, is low rank.
Now, from Proposition 2, we know that either B  H∗EHE
and λ > 0, or B ≺ H∗EHE and λ < 0. This is a contradiction
since B  H∗EHE , yielding that K˜X is low rank.
Proposition 8: The rank of K˜X being r < n, that is KX =
UXU
∗
X with UX an n× r matrix, the optimal solution to
min
A
I˜(X;Y |Z)
is given by
A∗ = (HE(KXH∗MHM + I)
−1UXV QW )
(HM (KXH∗MHM + I)
−1UXV PW )−1.
Proof: The Jordan decomposition of M is now given by
M
(
HM P
HE Q
)
=
(
HM P
HE Q
)(
J 0
0 −I
)
where
J = (I+KXH∗MHM )
−1(KXH∗M −KXH∗E)
(
HM
HE
)
−I.
Let us now look more carefully at J . We first notice that when
KX is low rank, −1 is an eigenvalue. This is clear since
J + I = (I + KXH∗MHM )
−1KX(H∗M −H∗E)
(
HM
HE
)
and det(KX) = 0. Furthermore, since KX = UXU∗X , we have
J = (I + KXH∗MHM )
−1UXU∗X(H
∗
M −H∗E)
(
HM
HE
)
− I
and clearly (I + KXH∗MHM )
−1UX is an invariant subspace
of J . A Jordan basis is thus given by
P ′ =
(
(I + KXH∗MHM )
−1UX Q′
)
where Q′ is the eigenspace associated to −1. This thus gives us
a more precise Jordan basis for M (as defined in (9)), namely[
HMP
′ P
HEP
′ Q
]
=
[
HM (KXH∗MHM + I)
−1UX HMQ′ P
HE(KXH∗MHM + I)
−1UX HEQ′ Q
]
.
From this Jordan basis of M , we have that
A∗ = (HE(KXH∗MHM + I)
−1UXV QW )
(HM (KXH∗MHM + I)
−1UXV PW )−1
is a solution of the Ricatti equation, where W is any nM ×
(nM − r) matrix, and V is any r × r matrix.
C. The converse matches the achievability
We can now conclude.
Proposition 9: Let
A∗ = (HE(KXH∗MHM + I)
−1UXV QW )
(HM (KXH∗MHM + I)
−1UXV PW )−1
be a solution of the Ricatti equation. Then
I˜(X;Y |Z) = log det(I+HMKXH∗M )−log det(I+HEKXH∗E).
Furthermore, there exists V,W such that I−AA∗  0.
Now that the matrix A∗ is known explicitly, this can be
checked by computation, which is omitted here by lack of
space (see [18]).
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the problem of computing the
perfect secrecy capacity of a multiple antenna channel, based
on a generalization of the wire-tap channel to a MIMO broad-
cast wire-tap channel. We proved that for an arbitrary number
of transmit/receive antennas, the perfect secrecy capacity is the
difference of the two capacities, the one of the legitimate user
minus the one of the eavesdropper, after a suitable optimization
over the transmitter’s input covariance matrix.
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